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Research on intergenerational income mobility is based on current income since data on 
lifetime income are typically not available for two generations. However, using snapshots of 
income over shorter periods causes a so-called life-cycle bias if the snapshots cannot mimic 
lifetime outcomes. Using uniquely long series of Swedish income data, we show that current 
empirical strategies do not eliminate such bias. We focus on the widely adopted generalized 
errors-in-variables model and find that the remaining bias is substantial (20% of the true 
elasticity from left-side measurement error at the most relevant age range). IV estimates 
suffer from even stronger life-cycle effects and do not provide an upper bound. 
Inconsistencies stem from the interaction of two factors: heterogeneity in income profiles 
cannot be fully accounted for, and idiosyncratic deviations from average profiles correlate 
with individual characteristics and family background. We discuss implications of our findings 
for other literatures that depend on measurement of long-run income and income dynamics. 
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Introduction
Transmission of economic status within families is often measured by the intergenerational
elasticity between parents’ and children’s lifetime income. A large and growing literature
has estimated this parameter in order to analyze the extent of intergenerational mobility
across countries, groups and time.1 Unfortunately, the estimates in the early literature suf-
fered greatly from measurement error in lifetime income, and successive improvements of the
methodology led to large-scale corrections.2
While the early estimates were severely attenuated from approximation of lifetime values
by noisy single-year income data for parents, Jenkins (1987) identiﬁes systematic deviations of
current from lifetime values over the life cycle as an additional source of inconsistency.3 Haider
and Solon (2006) and Grawe (2006) show that the latter is empirically of great importance.
Various reﬁned methods to eliminate such life-cycle bias have recently been presented and the
generalized errors-in-variables model proposed by Haider and Solon has been widely adopted
in the literature.
Our contributions are as follows. First, we show that such reﬁned methods do not elimi-
nate life-cycle bias in intergenerational elasticity estimates. Second, we use Swedish income
tax data to quantify the importance of life-cycle eﬀects in both ordinary least squares (OLS)
and instrumental variable (IV) estimates. Our data contain nearly complete income histories
of both fathers and sons, allowing us to derive a benchmark estimate for the intergenera-
tional elasticity and thus to directly expose the life-cycle bias. Third, we discuss how current
procedures can be modiﬁed to reduce life-cycle bias. Fourth, we discuss our results in the
more general context of income dynamics over the life cycle. We conclude that (unobserved)
income proﬁle heterogeneity is substantial, can have stark consequences, and is harder to
address than is commonly believed.
We speciﬁcally focus on the generalized errors-in-variables model, which suggests that
intergenerational elasticities can be consistently estimated if lifetime income is approximated
by current income at a certain age. We ﬁnd that this procedure improves estimates but that
the life-cycle bias is substantially larger than the generalized model predicts. The model
disregards some of the heterogeneity in income proﬁles, and can therefore not eliminate
life-cycle bias in intergenerational mobility or other applications. The remaining bias from
left-side measurement error alone amounts to about 20 percent of the true intergenerational
elasticity (0.21 vs. 0.27), even under favorable conditions.4
We also analyze two other methods to address measurement error in lifetime income: we
illustrate why the consideration of diﬀerential income growth across subgroups will not yield
consistent estimates, and show that IV estimates suﬀer from even greater life-cycle eﬀects
than OLS estimates. IV estimators do therefore not provide an upper bound of the true
parameter, contrary to such arguments in the previous literature.
Our results are hence rather pessimistic. They imply that current methods to compensate
for incomplete income data are less successful than commonly believed, casting doubts on the
accuracy of mobility estimates as well as on the validity of comparisons across populations.
1See Solon (1999) for a comprehensive evaluation of the early empirical literature. Recent surveys include
Björklund and Jäntti (2009) and Black and Devereux (2011).
2For example, the intergenerational elasticity of earnings for fathers and sons in the U.S. was estimated
to be less than 0.2 among early studies (surveyed in Becker and Tomes, 1986), ranged between about 0.3 and
0.5 in the studies surveyed in Solon (1999), and is estimated to be around 0.6 or above in more recent studies
like Mazumder (2005) and Gouskova et al. (2010).
3For example, lifetime income of highly educated individuals might be systematically understated by
current income at young age if income growth increases with education.
4Assuming that central parameters of the generalized errors-in-variables model are perfectly observed, so
that current income is measured at the exact proposed age. Adding right-side measurement error aggravates
the life-cycle bias further if fathers’ and sons’ incomes are measured at similar ages.1 THE INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY LITERATURE 2
However, having a benchmark elasticity allows us to describe the direction and magnitude of
the bias at diﬀerent stages in the life cycle, and to provide recommendations for researchers.
We ﬁnd that annual income at a late age provides a more reliable base for application of
the generalized errors-in-variables model, that averaging over multiple income observations
reduces life-cycle bias, and that the treatment of missing and zero income observations has
important consequences.
Life-cycle bias stems from a more general mechanism involving the interaction of two
factors: heterogeneity in income proﬁles cannot be fully accounted for, and unobserved id-
iosyncratic deviations from average proﬁles correlate with individual and family character-
istics. This mechanism is of importance for other literatures that depend on measurement
of long-run income and income dynamics. Major examples among these include studies on
the returns to schooling, and the extensive literature that relates measures of stochastic in-
come shocks to consumption or other outcomes. We discuss both in some detail. We further
present evidence that unexplained dispersion in income growth is at least partially due to
latent heterogeneity instead of persistent stochastic shocks.
The next section describes the general methodology and identifying assumptions employed
in the early literature. We then examine methods based on more recent contributions: the
generalized errors-in-variables model theoretically in section 2 and empirically in section 3,
IV methods and consideration of income dynamics across subgroups in section 4. Section 5
reviews implications for other literatures, section 6 concludes.
1 The Intergenerational Mobility Literature
The prototypical regression model in intergenerational mobility research is
y∗
s,i = βy∗
f,i + ￿i, (1)
where y∗
s,i denotes log lifetime income of the son in family i, y∗
f,i log lifetime income of his
father, ￿i is an error term that is orthogonal to y∗
f,i, and variables are expressed as deviations
from their generational means.5 The coeﬃcient β is interpreted as the intergenerational
income elasticity.
Equations akin to (1) appear in two distinctive forms in the literature. First, as a sta-
tistical relationship to measure the outcome of interest, i.e. the degree of intergenerational
mobility. Second, as a structural relationship to study causal mechanisms of intergenerational
transmission, derived from an economic model as in Becker and Tomes (1979). The statistical
relationship is typically based on broad ex-post measures of long-run economic status such
as lifetime income. The structural relationship instead relates to the ex-ante concept “per-
manent income”, since expectations on long-run status determine individual behavior.6 For
simplicity, our analysis relates to the statistical relationship, but incomplete measurement of
long-run status impedes identiﬁcation of both types.
5We use the terms earnings and income interchangeably (since the issues that arise are similar), and
examine fathers and sons since this has been the baseline case in the literature. A growing literature exists
on intergenerational mobility in other family dimensions (e.g mothers, daughters or siblings) and in other
income concepts (such as household income), for which our analysis is likewise relevant.
6For various reasons these concepts are not always clearly distinguished. First, simple economic models
assign one time period to each generation, so that the concept of permanent and lifetime income coincide.
Second, permanent income is diﬃcult to measure. Empirical analysis of the structural relationship is still
based on ex-post measures of (current) income, and is then often similar to the statistical relationship. Third,
some of the empirical work in the literature has lately adopted the term “permanent income” even while
focusing on the measurement of outcomes.1 THE INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY LITERATURE 3
Approximation of Lifetime Income
As commonly available data sets do not contain complete income histories for two generations,
a major challenge is how to approximate lifetime income.7 Let yi be some observed proxy for
unobserved log lifetime income of an individual in family i, e.g. a single-year observation, an
average of multiple annual income observations, or a more complex estimate based on such




s,i is the unobserved true log lifetime income of the son in family i and us,i is mea-
surement error. Similarly, for the father we observe
yf,i = y∗
f,i + uf,i.
The probability limit of the OLS estimator from a linear regression of ys on yf can be
decomposed into












where we used eq. (1) to substitute for y∗
s,i and applied the covariance restriction Cov(y∗
f,i,￿ i)=
0. It follows that the estimator can be down- or upward biased and that the covariances be-
tween measurement errors and lifetime incomes impact on consistency. The empirical strate-
gies employed in the literature in the last decades can be broadly categorized in terms of
changes in identifying assumptions about these covariances.
First Two Waves of Studies
The ﬁrst wave of studies, surveyed in Becker and Tomes (1986), neglected the problem of
measurement error in lifetime status. Often just single-year income measures were used as







Classical measurement error in lifetime income violates the latter assumption, so that
estimates suﬀered from large attenuation bias. Estimates of the intergenerational elasticity
were therefore too low. This problem was recognized in Atkinson (1980) and then frequently
addressed in the second wave of studies (surveyed in Solon 1999). But the assumption
remained that measurement errors are random noise, independent of each other and of true
lifetime income. That life-cycle variation had to be accounted for was recognized, but it was







Va r(uf) ￿=0 .
If these hold, then the probability limit in eq. (2) reduces to
7Note that the availability of better data would not generally solve the identiﬁcation problem, since data
sets cannot contain complete income histories for contemporary populations.2 THE GENERALIZED ERRORS-IN-VARIABLES MODEL 4






This is the classical errors-in-variables model; inconsistencies are limited to attenuation
bias caused by measurement error in lifetime income of fathers. In contrast, measurement
error in sons’ lifetime income is not a source of inconsistency in this model.8 Researchers
typically used averages of multiple income observations for fathers to increase the signal-to-
noise ratio, but gave less attention to the measurement of sons’ income.
Recent Literature
Recently the focus has been on the existence of non-classical measurement error. An early
theoretical discussion can be found in Jenkins (1987). Analyzing a simple model of income
formation, he ﬁnds that usage of current incomes in eq. (1) will bias ˆ β as income growth over
the life cycle varies across individuals. He concludes that the direction of this life-cycle bias
is ambiguous, that it can be large, and that it will not necessarily be smaller if fathers’ and
sons’ incomes are measured at the same age.
Haider and Solon (2006) demonstrate that life-cycle bias can explain the previously noted
pattern that intergenerational elasticity estimates increase with the age of sampled sons.9
They show that the association between current and lifetime income varies systematically
over the life cycle, contrary to a classical errors-in-variables model with measurement error
independent of true values. Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) ﬁnd strikingly similar patterns
in a replication study with Swedish data.
Haider and Solon also note that controlling for the central tendency of income growth in
the population by including age controls in eq. (1) will not suﬃce, as variation around the
average growth rate will bias estimates. Vogel (2006) provides an illustration based on the
insight that highly educated workers experience steeper-than-average income growth. Since
available data tend to cover annual incomes of young sons and old fathers, lifetime incomes
of highly educated sons (fathers) will be understated (overstated). It then follows from eq.
(2) that ˆ βapprox is biased further downwards than implied by the classical errors-in-variables
model.10 Indeed, ˆ βapprox can be negative in extreme cases, as our data conﬁrm. Various
reﬁned estimation procedures have been proposed to address such life-cycle bias. We proceed
to examine the most popular one in detail.
2 The Generalized Errors-in-Variables Model
Haider and Solon (HS) formulate a generalized errors-in-variables (GEiV) model that incorpo-
rates variation in the association between annual and lifetime income over the life cycle. Their
empirical analysis documents that this variation is substantial, with important implications
for analyses based on short-term income measures and, in particular, the intergenerational
mobility literature. HS argue that left-side measurement error can cause substantial life-
cycle bias in intergenerational elasticity estimates, but that it is innocuous for consistency
8The parameter β is identiﬁed if the number of income observations for fathers is suﬃciently large, if a
consistent estimator for the attenuation factor can be derived, or if moment restrictions on the measurement
errors can be justiﬁed, e.g. by inferring the distribution of the measurement errors from a diﬀerent data set.
9For a summary, see Solon (1999). Age-dependency of elasticity estimates could also arise if the dispersion
in transitory income and thus the attenuation bias vary over the life cycle. Such variation has been documented
in Björklund (1993) for Sweden, but Grawe (2006) ﬁnds that the observed age-dependency can be better
explained by the existence of life-cycle bias.
10If educational achievement is correlated within families, and if high education tends to correspond to high
lifetime income, we have Cov(y
∗
f,u s) < 0, Cov(y
∗
s,u f) < 0, Cov(us,u f) < 0 and Cov(y
∗
f,u f) > 0.2 THE GENERALIZED ERRORS-IN-VARIABLES MODEL 5
if lifetime income of sons are proxied by annual income at a certain age. The GEiV model
has been widely adopted in the literature, and the procedure of measuring income around a
certain age (around midlife) frequently applied.11
The underlying intuition of the model is that, for two individuals with diﬀerent income
trajectories, there will nevertheless exist an age t∗ where the diﬀerence between their log
annual income equals the diﬀerence between their log (annuitized) lifetime income. HS argue
that the classical errors-in-variables model holds at t∗. HS ﬁrst focus on left-side measurement
error and assume that y∗
s,i is unobserved and proxied by ys,it, log annual income of sons at
age t. The GEiV model is given by
ys,it = λs,ty∗
s,i + us,it, (3)
where λs,t is allowed to vary by age and us,it is orthogonal to y∗
s,i. Regressing ys,it on y∗
f,i
by OLS, and using eqs. (3) and (1) to substitute for ys,it and y∗
s,i, yields













f,u s,t)=0 , (5)
and conclude that left-side measurement error is innocuous for consistency if the sample is
restricted to annual income of sons around an age t∗ where λs,t is close to one.
However, we argue that assumptions akin to (5) will typically not hold since idiosyncratic
deviations from average income trajectories correlate with individual and family characteris-
tics. This is in particular problematic in intergenerational mobility estimation.
Note that for more than two workers we will generally not ﬁnd an age t∗ where annual
income is an undistorted approximation of lifetime income. Figure 1 illustrates this by plot-
ting log income trajectories for workers 1, 2 (as in Figure 1 in HS) and an additional worker
3. The horizontal lines depict log annuitized lifetime income, and diﬀerences in workers’ log
lifetime income are given by the vertical distances between these lines. At age t∗
1 the distance
between the annual income trajectories equals the distance between the horizontal lines for
worker 1 and 2, and at age t∗
2 for worker 1 and 3. There exists no age where these distances
are equal for all three workers at once.12
This illustrates that the coeﬃcient λs,t is merely a population parameter that reﬂects
how diﬀerences in annual income and diﬀerences in lifetime income relate on average in the
population. Individuals will nevertheless deviate from this average relationship, so that their
annual income still over- or understates their lifetime income. For intergenerational mobility
studies it is crucial that λs,t contains no information on if such deviations (us,it from eq. 3)
correlate within families. The assumption that us,it and y∗
f,i are uncorrelated would mean
that the relation between annual and lifetime income does not depend on family background.
However, there are reasons to expect such dependency: parents can transmit abilities, or
inﬂuence their oﬀspring’s educational and occupational choice, all of which could aﬀect the
shape of income proﬁles over the life cycle.
11Among others, in Gouskova et al. (2010) for the US; Björklund et al. (2006, 2009) for Sweden; Nilsen
et al. (forthcoming) for Norway; Raaum et al. (2007) for Denmark, Finland, Norway, the UK and the US;
Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) for the UK; Piraino (2007) and Mocetti (2007) for Italy. More examples are
covered in the surveys of Björklund and Jäntti (2009) and Black and Devereux (2011).
12This result does not depend on any peculiarities in the income growth process. Even for a simple linear
formation of log annual income as analyzed in HS, the diﬀerence between log income yit and log annuitized
lifetime income depends on the income growth rate γi; it will have the same value for at most two distinctive
realizations of γi; and will therefore systematically diﬀer across individuals at any age t (proof in Appendix
A1).3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 6
Similar arguments apply on an aggregate level. We thus expect diﬀerent subgroups of the
population to have systematically diﬀerent relationships between annual and lifetime income.
For example, diﬀerent educational groups might experience diﬀerent income growth over the
life cycle, such that their annual incomes systematically over- or understate their lifetime
income relative to the population.13
Technically, we examine the validity of assumption (5) by deriving the elements of us,it
for a given income formation model and analyzing its relation to y∗
f,i.I tt u r n so u tt h a tus,it
is correlated with the regressor y∗
f,i even for the simple log-linear income formation model
employed in HS (see Appendix A.2). The probability limit of ˆ βt does therefore not generally
equal λs,tβ since this correlation causes an omitted-variable bias. Corresponding biases arise
in the case of right-side measurement error in which unobserved lifetime income of fathers
is approximated by annual income (see Appendix A.3) and if approximations are made for
both fathers and sons (Appendix A.4).
3 The GEiV Model: Empirical Evidence
We use Swedish panel data containing nearly life-long income histories to provide direct evi-
dence on the life-cycle bias that remains after application of the GEiV model. The size of the
bias depends on two factors. First, the complexity of income dispersion in the population.14
Second, if the income dispersion is caused by heterogeneity or stochastic shocks. The former
more than the latter would cause idiosyncratic deviations from average income proﬁles to be
correlated within families.15 Our ﬁndings will thus also be indicative about how complex the
dispersion in income proﬁles is, and if its underlying causes are deterministic or stochastic.
We will return to these issues in section 5.
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
To the best of our knowledge, Swedish tax registry data oﬀer the longest panel of income data,
covering annual incomes across 48 years for a large and representative share of the population.
Moreover, a multi-generational register matches children to parents, and census data provide
information on schooling and other individual characteristics. All merged together, the data
provide a unique possibility to examine life-cycle bias in intergenerational mobility estimation
using actual income histories.
To select our sample, we apply a number of necessary restrictions. As we mainly aim to
make a methodological point, we follow the majority of the literature and limit our sample to
sons and their biological fathers. To these we merge income data for the years 1960-2007.16
Since most other income measures are available only from 1968, we use total (pre-tax) income,
which is the sum of an individual’s labor (and labor-related) earnings, early-age pensions,
and net income from business and capital realizations.
Our main analysis is based on sons born 1955-1957. Earlier cohorts could be used, but
then we would observe fewer early-career incomes for fathers. Conversely, later cohorts are
not included, since we want to follow the sons for as long as possible. Moreover, to avoid
13Such correlation between uit and education would imply that the GEiV model can, for example, not be
readily applied in the return to schooling literature. We provide evidence supporting this in a later section.
14For example, if individuals merely diﬀer in linear income growth then diﬀerences in log lifetime income
are well approximated by diﬀerences in log current income around midlife for the whole population and the
GEiV model would perform relatively well.
15Simulation studies as in Stuhler (2010) can illustrate these arguments but are not informative about the
size of the bias in applications, since the bias varies strongly with unknown characteristics of the income
generating process.
16Income data for the year 1967 are missing in the registry.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 7
large diﬀerences in the birth year of fathers, we exclude pairs where the father was older than
28 years at the son’s birth. Young fathers and ﬁrst-born sons are thus over-represented in
our sample. Although this is a limitation, we expect any detected bias for this particular
sample to understate the bias in the population.17 On other sampling issues, we adopt the
restrictions applied by HS and Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006).18
Our data come with a couple of drawbacks. To maximize the length of the income histories
we use the measure total income, whereas e.g. HS use labor earnings. However, total income
is a highly relevant measure of economic status, approximation of lifetime status gives rise
to the same methodological challenges, and Böhlmark and Lindquist ﬁnd that total income
and earnings yield similar results for the intergenerational mobility of sons. Further, the use
of tax-based data could raise concern about missing data in the low end of the distribution if
individuals have no income to declare. The Swedish system however provides strong incentives
to declare some taxable income since doing so is a requirement for eligibility to most social
insurance programs. Hence, this concern most likely only applies to a very small share of the
population.
Our data also have many advantages. First, they are almost entirely free from attrition.
Second, they pertain to all jobs. Third, in contrast to many other studies, our data are not
right-censored. Fourth, we use registry data, which is believed to suﬀer less from reporting
errors than survey data. Fifth, and most important, we have annual data from 1960 to 2007,
giving us nearly career-long series of income for both sons and their fathers. Overall, we
believe that the data are the best available for the purpose of this study.
Our main sample consists of 3504 pairs of fathers and sons, with all sons’ income measured
from age 22 to age 50 and all fathers’ income measured from age 33 to age 65, irrespective
of birth years. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. Rows (2) and (3) show that dispersions
in lifetime income are of similar magnitudes for fathers and sons. Rows (4) and (5) provide
information on the number of positive income observations. On average there are more than
28 observations for sons, and more than 30 for fathers, with relatively low dispersion in both
cases.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
To assess the size of life-cycle bias, we compare estimates based on annual incomes with a
benchmark estimate that is based on lifetime incomes. As in the theoretical discussion, we
focus on left-side measurement error, although we provide brief evidence on life-cycle bias due
to right-side and measurement error on both sides in a later subsection. We do this for two
reasons. First, left-side measurement error has until recently been neglected in the literature.
Second, life-cycle bias is not confounded by attenuation bias from classical measurement error
on the left-hand side, which simpliﬁes the analysis.
We ﬁrst compute log lifetime incomes y∗
f,i and y∗
s,i using our series of income data. We
use these to estimate eq. (1), yielding our benchmark estimate ˆ β.19 We then approximate
17Reduced sample heterogeneity will tend to decrease heterogeneity in income proﬁles, which in turn di-
minishes the idiosyncratic deviations from sample average relationships between annual and lifetime income
that cause life-cycle bias.
18We restrict the sample to fathers and sons who report positive income in at least 10 years. We exclude
those who died before age 50, and sons who immigrated to Sweden after age 16 or migrated from Sweden on
al o n g - t e r mb a s i s( a tl e a s t1 0y e a r s ) .I n c o m e sa r ei n2 0 0 5p r i c e s ,a n da na n n u a ld i s c o u n tr a t eo f2p e r c e n ti s
used to calculate the discounted present value of lifetime income. Discounting procedures should adjust for
economic growth if year of birth varies substantially. Otherwise β will partially reﬂect shared experience of
economic growth through the correlation between father’s and son’s year of birth.
19Of course, this estimate is not exactly true since we still lack some years of income. This is however
irrelevant for the validity of our approach to use it as benchmark. The GEiV model is not restricted to any
speciﬁc population, and should therefore be applicable to our variant of the Swedish population in which we3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 8
log lifetime income of sons y∗
s,i by log annual income ys,it (left-side measurement error) to
reestimate eq. (1) separately for each age t, yielding a set of estimates ˆ βt. Finally, we estimate
eq. (3), which provides us with estimates of λs,t.
Under the assumptions of the GEiV model, the probability limit of ˆ βt equals λs,tβ,a n du s -
ing annual income of sons at age t* where λs,t =1consistently estimates β.20 As discussed in
the previous section, we anticipate ˆ βt to be biased even after adjustment by ˆ λs,t. The remain-
ing life-cycle bias after such adjustment by the GEiV model, denoted by ˆ b(t)=ˆ βt/ˆ λs,t − ˆ β,
is thus of central interest.21 Note that we assume that ˆ λs,t is known in order to evaluate
the model’s theoretical capability to adjust for life-cycle bias under favorable conditions. A
second (known) source of inconsistency can arise in that the age proﬁle of λs,t will typically
not be directly observed by the researcher.
3.3 Empirical Evidence
We ﬁrst present estimates of λs,t. Figure 2 shows that ˆ λs,t rises over age and crosses one at
around age t∗ = 33. Largely consistent with others, we ﬁnd that income diﬀerences at young
(old) age substantially understate (overstate) diﬀerences in lifetime income.22
Our central estimates are presented in Figure 3, which plots ˆ β (the benchmark elasticity),
ˆ βt (estimates based on annual income of sons at age t), and ˆ βt/ˆ λs,t (estimates at age t
adjusted by the GEiV model). The sample is balanced at each age, such that zero or missing
income observations that are not considered for estimation of one coeﬃcient are not used for
estimation of the other coeﬃcients. Hence the estimated benchmark elasticity varies slightly
by age. We list our key ﬁndings.
First. Our benchmark estimate of the intergenerational elasticity of lifetime income for
our Swedish cohort is about 0.27. This is marginally higher than what most previous studies
have found for Sweden, and should be closer to the population parameter due to our nearly
complete income proﬁles.23
Second. We conﬁrm that the variation of ˆ βt over age resembles the pattern in ˆ λs,t,a s
predicted by HS. We therefore ﬁnd that ˆ βt increases with age and that the life-cycle bias is
negative for young and positive for old ages of sons. One of the central predictions of the
GEiV model, that current income around mid-life is a better proxy for lifetime income than
income in very young or very old ages, is thus conﬁrmed.
Third. The magnitude of life-cycle bias stemming from left-side measurement error alone
can be striking. For example, analysis based on annual income of sons only two years below
age t∗ yields ˆ βt =0 .191, in contrast to a benchmark estimate that is almost 40 percent larger.
truncate income proﬁles at some age. It is nevertheless advantageous that we have long income histories.
First, our benchmark estimate will be closer to the true value. Second, since the income proﬁles contain most
of the idiosyncratic heterogeneity that leads to life-cycle bias, our estimate of the bias will be representative
for a typical application. We provide evidence that our main ﬁndings are not sensitive to the exact length of
observed income histories in section 3.4.
20Since age is a discrete variable, λs,t will not necessarily equal exactly one at t*. We adjust ˆ βt according
to eq. (3) by ˆ λ
−1
s,t at all ages, inlcuding t*.
21The arguments of HS relate to the probability limit. In a ﬁnite sample we need to consider the distribution
of ˆ b(t). Reported standard errors for ˆ b(t) are based on a Taylor approximation and take the covariance
structure of ˆ β, ˆ βt,a n dˆ λs,t into account.
22Bhuller et al. (2011) ﬁnd a very similar t
∗ for Norway. This is reassuring since they use labor earnings
as income measure and observe somewhat longer income histories (ages 20-58) for a single generation. Our
result that income diﬀerences at old age overstate diﬀerences in lifetime income diﬀers from results for cohorts
born in the 1930s in both HS and Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006), but are in line with results for cohorts
born in the 1950s in Böhlmark and Lindquist, and Bhuller et al.
23Our benchmark elasticity is nevertheless still likely to understate the true intergenerational elasticity. We
lack some early observations of fathers and late observations of sons, which reduces σy∗
s and increases σy∗
f,
thereby reducing the numerator and increasing the denominator of the OLS estimator.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 9
Moreover, analysis based on income below age 26 yields a negative elasticity. We therefore
ﬁnd direct evidence on the importance of life-cycle bias in intergenerational mobility estimates
that has been discussed in the recent literature.
Fourth. The life-cycle bias is larger than implied by the GEiV model. While the ad-
justment of estimates according to this model leads on average to sizable improvements, it
cannot fully eliminate the bias. This holds true even under the assumption that the central
parameters λs,t are perfectly observed. The remaining bias is overall substantial, and espe-
cially large for young ages. Intergenerational elasticity estimates based on income at very
young ages are still negative.
Fifth. The life-cycle bias is not minimized at age t∗, the age at which the current empirical
literature aims to measure income, but at an age t>t ∗. We report a similar pattern for
other cohorts in section 3.4.
Sixth. The remaining life-cycle bias ˆ b(t) around age t∗ is substantial and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Table 2 shows that ˆ b(t) is on average around 0.05 over ages 31-35, which
corresponds to about 20 percent of our benchmark. Furthermore, the large deviation from
this average at age 32 indicates that the year-to-year variation can be large. Knowledge of
age t∗ will thus not eliminate life-cycle bias.
We brieﬂy compare these empirical results with our theoretical discussion of the determi-
nants of ˆ b(t). Table 3 decomposes ˆ b(t) according to eq. (4). Variation of ˆ b(t) over age stems
mostly from variation in the residual correlation Corr(y∗
f,u s,t), while the ratio σus,t/λs,tσy∗
f
is close to one over most of the life cycle.24 Seemingly small residual correlations can thus
translate into substantive biases. For example, a residual correlation of 0.03 translates into
a life-cycle bias of more than 10 percent of the benchmark elasticity.
These results provide guidance for applied research, but some remarks about generaliz-
ability are warranted. Life-cycle bias will diﬀer quantitatively across populations. The bias is
determined by the degree of systematic diﬀerences in income proﬁles between sons from poor
and sons from rich families. This mechanism is likely to vary across cohorts and countries.
The question is if observed qualitative patterns over age can nevertheless be generalized.
Figure 3 demonstrates that annual income at late age provides a more reliable base for ap-
plication of the GEiV model in intergenerational studies than income at young age. The
remaining life-cycle bias is large and negative up until the early forties, but then small for
most older ages.25 Thus, the relationship between current and lifetime income diﬀers with
respect to family background particularly at the beginning of the life cycle. This result is
intuitive if one considers potential causal mechanisms of intergenerational transmission. Sons
from rich families might acquire more education or face diﬀerent conditions that particularly
aﬀect initial job search (e.g. regarding credit-constraints, family networks, or ex-ante infor-
mation on labor market characteristics). Such mechanisms are likely to apply to some degree
to most populations. Although the size of the life-cycle bias is bound to diﬀer across popula-
tions, its pattern over age is thus likely to hold more generally. This conclusion is supported
by results for other Swedish cohorts, as we will discuss later on.
3.4 Extensions
We proceed to examine alterations of the estimation procedure to reduce the bias, test the
sensitivity of our results, and discuss if adjustments according to the GEiV model can elimi-
nate life-cycle bias in other applications.
24The previously documented increase in λs,t over age is oﬀset by an increase in σus,t.
25The latter result cannot easily be exploited. Adjustment of ˆ βt by ˆ λs,t can rarely be done in practice due
to lack of information on the latter. Importing estimates of λs,t from other sources can be misleading since
its pattern over age could diﬀer across populations.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 10
Multi-Year Averages of Current Income
Some recent studies that reference to the GEiV model (see footnote 11) average over multiple
income observations of sons, although without clear theoretical motivation. One rationale
could be that researchers do not know the exact age at which λs,t equals one. Our result that
life-cycle bias is substantial even if this age would be known raises the question if and how
such practice can help to reduce the bias.
We therefore estimate βt using three-, ﬁve- and seven-year averages of son’s income cen-
tered around age t∗. These averages are also used to estimate λs,t, and the remaining life-cycle
bias after adjustment by ˆ λs,t. The results are presented in Table 4. The remaining life-cycle
bias falls in the number of income observations but is not eliminated. For the seven-year
average, the estimated bias (in absolute value) is on average slightly below 0.03 at ages 31-35
compared to about 0.05 using one-year measures. The residual variance ˆ σus,t decreases by
about a third when moving from one- to seven-year measures, and diminishes the estimated
bias proportionally. The residual correlation falls only slightly and estimates of λs,t remain
stable. These improvements are moderate, but they still lead us to recommend averaging
over multiple income observations on the left-hand side when possible.
Treatment of Outliers in the Income Data
Intergenerational elasticity estimates can be sensitive to how one treats outliers in general,
and observations of zero or missing income in particular (Couch and Lillard, 1998; Dahl and
DeLeire, 2008). We test the robustness of our results along this dimension by (i) balancing
the sample across ages such that only sons with positive income in all ages 31-35 are included,
(ii) bottom-coding very low non-missing incomes, and (iii) top-coding very high incomes.26
We compare the life-cycle bias for ages 31-35 for each of these samples (presented in Table
Table 5) with the results for our main sample in Table 2.
Estimates of the remaining life-cycle bias are on average about a third lower for the
balanced sample than for our main sample (at ages 31-35), but still correspond to more than
10 percent of the benchmark elasticity. Decreases in both the residual correlation and residual
variance contribute to this drop.27 Bottom-coding has the opposite eﬀect and increases the
bias slightly since observations with zero income are now always included. Finally, results
for a sample with top-coded incomes are very similar to those for the main sample, implying
low sensitivity to the exact measurement of high incomes. While we thus ﬁnd that zero and
missing incomes are inﬂuential for the size of life-cycle bias, it is not obvious what the right
sampling choice would be. To derive a general measure of mobility one would like to include
all individuals, but our analysis shows that doing so comes with the cost of increased life-cycle
bias.
Length of Observed Income Proﬁles
Although our data are to our knowledge the best available for our purpose, it might be a
concern that our measures of lifetime income are still based on incomplete income histories.
We thus perform a number of robustness tests. We consider a younger cohort — sons born
26As of the log-speciﬁcation we do not expect high extremes to have as large inﬂuence as low extremes.
Top-coding has however been suggested to test the sensitivity to some changes of administrative routines and
tax levels across our time period (see Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006).
27Excluding those with occasional zeros or missings reduces the number of extreme values and thereby the
variation in us,it. The residual correlation decreases since individuals with frequent zero and missing income
observations are likely to experience quite diﬀerent income proﬁles than the average population, and therefore
amplify the heterogeneity in income proﬁles that causes the residual correlation.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 11
1958-60 — to study the inﬂuence of early-age income data of fathers, and an older cohort —
born 1952-54 — to study the inﬂuence of late-age data of sons.
Age proﬁles of the life-cycle bias before and after adjustment by ˆ λs,t are shown in Figures
4 (main sample), 5 (cohort 1958-60), and 6 (cohort 1952-54) for variations of the age spans.
Abstracting from general cohort diﬀerences, we ﬁnd that changes in the fathers’ age span have
little eﬀect on the life-cycle bias, probably due to our focus on left-side measurement error.
In contrast, changes in the sons’ age span cause noticeable shifts. This is not unexpected
since changes in the age span on which our measures of lifetime income are based are likely to
alter both σy∗
s and λs,t slightly. While the exact relation between the size of the life-cycle bias
and age therefore depends on the deﬁnition of the age span, the major facts remain stable:
the remaining life-cycle bias after adjustment by ˆ λs,t can be large and tends to be negative
for young ages and around t∗.
Cohort and Population Diﬀerences
We use the same three cohort groups to brieﬂy assess if the magnitude of life-cycle bias can
be expected to vary across populations. To separate true cohort diﬀerences from diﬀerences
due to age span deﬁnitions, we limit the income proﬁles of both fathers and sons to the
longest age span observed in all three samples. We thus use incomes of sons for ages 22-47,
and incomes of fathers for ages 36-65.28 Diﬀerences between these samples are hence due to
their respective data generating processes. Table 6 presents the most central results around
age t∗ for each sample.29
The 1958-60 cohort has an estimated benchmark elasticity ˆ β that is similar to our main
cohort but a slightly larger remaining life-cycle bias ˆ b(t). For the 1952-54 cohort both ˆ β
and ˆ b(t) are substantially lower. The diﬀerences in ˆ b(t) — substantial even for large samples
and a ﬁxed sampling procedure across cohorts within Sweden — conﬁrm that life-cycle bias
should be expected to diﬀer across studies and populations also after adjustment by ˆ λs,t.
The GEiV Model in Other Applications
The GEiV model can be applied to other literatures that use short-run income to proxy
for unobserved long-run values. However, we argue that the model will not eliminate life-
cycle bias in such other applications since assumptions akin to (5) on the covariance between
residuals and the explanatory variable are generally unlikely to hold.
To provide brief evidence, we examine if the residuals from eq. (3) correlate with a range
of characteristics that are of interest in various literatures, speciﬁcally (i) father’s age at
birth of his son, (ii) father’s education, (iii) son’s education, (iv) son’s cognitive ability, and
(v) son’s country of birth. Table 7 describes how each variable is measured and presents
the results. As expected, most of these correlations are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Importantly, the residual correlations are non-zero also around age t∗. Knowing this age, or
the age proﬁle of λs,t, does therefore not allow researchers to fully control for life-cycle eﬀects.
The residuals correlate much stronger with son’s and father’s education than with father’s
log lifetime income, indicating that the GEiV model might perform worse in applications
in which education plays a central role.30 The correlations tend to be smaller when sons’
28Restricting the age intervals reduces the benchmark estimate. Dropping income observations for sons at
old age and fathers at young age decreases σy∗
s and increases σy∗
f,r e d u c i n gt h en u m e r a t o ra n di n c r e a s i n gt h e
denominator of the OLS estimator.
29More detailed evidence on cohort diﬀerences are provided in Figures 11 and 12.
30Correlation with the schooling variables is large in particular for young age, reﬂecting that income growth
of the highly educated is relatively strong while initial income is low.4 OTHER METHODS TO ADDRESS LIFE-CYCLE BIAS 12
income is measured at later ages, again supporting our argument that the GEiV performs
better when applied to current income at ages t>t ∗.
3.5 Measurement Error on the Right-Hand Side or Both Sides
Although our ﬁndings on left-side measurement error are conceptually interesting, evidence
on the combined eﬀects of life-cycle bias from both sides is more relevant for practitioners.
The questions arise whether we ﬁnd similar life-cycle eﬀects from the right-hand side, and
whether these tend to cancel out or aggravate the eﬀects from left-side measurement error.
Our data allow us to directly examine these questions. We now base estimates of βt on
lifetime income of sons and approximation of lifetime income by annual income for fathers
(right-side measurement error) or approximation for both fathers and sons (measurement
error on both sides). The probability limit of ˆ βt is then aﬀected by attenuation and life-cycle
bias. We adjust for both according to the GEiV model. Results are shown in Figures 7 and
8.31
Figure 7 demonstrates the additional large attenuating eﬀects from right-side measure-
ment error. The remaining life-cycle bias after adjustment by the GEiV model follows a
similar qualitative pattern over age as for the case of left-side measurement error. Figure
8 shows the remaining life-cycle bias in the case of measurement error on both sides with
fathers’ and sons’ incomes measured at similar ages. It is overall larger than for left-side
measurement error alone, thus indicating aggravating eﬀects of measurement error on both
sides.32 Importantly, this is also the case when fathers’ and sons’ incomes are measured at
their respective t∗. We again ﬁnd that the GEiV model is less successful in eliminating the
bias for early ages and around t∗ than for later ages. Moreover, the estimates suﬀer from
strong year-to-year variability, supporting the argument that comparisons of elasticity esti-
mates across populations are likely to be diﬃcult. Reducing this variability is an additional
motive for averaging over multiple income observations on both sides, apart from our previous
ﬁnding that it reduces the size of the bias.
4 Other Methods to Address Life-Cycle Bias
We brieﬂy examine two other methods employed in the intergenerational mobility literature.
We show that instrumental variable (IV) estimators do not yield an upper bound for β due
to life-cycle eﬀects, and discuss why consideration of diﬀerential income growth rates across
subgroups also yields inconsistent estimates.
4.1 Instrumental Variable Methods
IV methods have been proposed as an alternative way to tackle attenuation bias that stems
from right-side measurement error in eq. (1). Furthermore, in the form of two-sample IV
31Adjustment is based on separate estimates of λt for both fathers and sons, denoted ˆ λf,t and ˆ λs,t.A c c o r d i n g










uf,t))β for right-side and
λs,tθf,tβ for both-side measurement error (assuming Corr(us,it,u f,it)=0in addition to assumption 5).
Therefore the remaining life-cycle biases equal ˆ b(t)=ˆ βt/ˆ θf,t − ˆ β and ˆ b(t)=ˆ βt/ˆ λs,tˆ θf,t − ˆ β,r e s p e c t i v e l y .S e e
Appendix A.3 and A.4 for a detailed derivation of the components of these biases. For presentational purpose
we use only one age subscript t and display combinations of annual income for sons and fathers with equal
distances to their respective t
∗ in Figure 8
32This holds true if estimates are only adjusted for attenuation bias but not for life-cycle eﬀects according to
the GEiV model (see Figure 13). These results conﬁrm and substantiate the theoretical predictions of Jenkins
(1987) that measuring fathers’ and sons’ income at similar ages might not necessarily reduce life-cycle bias,
and contradict arguments in the recent literature that such “life course matching” generally leads to smaller
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(TSIV) they are heavily relied on for countries with less rich data.33 Little is however known
about life-cycle eﬀects in IV estimates.
Instruments used in the literature include indices of father’s socioeconomic status (Zim-
merman, 1992) and father’s education (Solon, 1992). Following Solon (1992), assume that
son’s lifetime income is determined by
y∗
s,i = η1y∗
f,i + η2Ef,i + εi,
where father’s education Ef,i is allowed to have a direct relation with son’s income in addition
to the indirect relation via father’s income. We are interested in the probability limit of
the estimated coeﬃcient ˆ βIV
approx from a two-stage least-squares regression of ys,i (with ys,i =
y∗
s,i+us,i)o nyf,i (with yf,i = y∗
f,i+uf,i).34 In the classical errors-in-variables model, assuming





























where the next to last step follows from the omitted-variable formula (see Solon, 1992, for a
detailed derivation).35 The IV estimator is then an upper bound for β if father’s education
has a non-negative relation with son’s income (ass. IV2) and if its correlation with father’s
lifetime income is bounded between zero and one (ass. IV3).
However, we argue that assumption IV1 that Ef,i is uncorrelated with uf,i and us,i does
typically not hold, e.g. since education is correlated with income growth rates. Typical panel
data cover income observations of young sons and old fathers. Then lifetime income of highly
educated sons (fathers) will be understated (overstated), even if we control for the central
tendency of income growth in the population. If education is correlated within families, then
Cov(Ef,u f) > 0 and Cov(Ef,u s) < 0. Allowing for non-classical measurement error, the
probability limit is more generally given by
plim ˆ βIV

















The example above illustrates that the latter two terms can be negative, so ˆ βIV
approx will not
necessarily be an upper bound for β. The results from Grawe (2006) and Haider and Solon
(2006) indicate that IV estimates might bound β if they are adjusted by a certain parameter
(λt in the GEiV model), or if they are based on income at an age at which this parameter
equals one. Our results imply that this is not the case since measurement errors in lifetime
income are not orthogonal to education in either case (see section 3.4).
33TSIV was ﬁrst applied to the intergenerational mobility literature by Björklund and Jäntti (1997).
34For generality we here use the notation from section 1 and exclude age subscripts.
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Empirical Evidence on Life-Cycle Bias in IV Estimates
We use our Swedish data to examine life-cycle bias in IV estimates. As most of the liter-
ature, we instrument for father’s income by his years of education.36 We again ﬁrst derive
a benchmark estimate ˆ βIV using our measures of lifetime income y∗
f and y∗
s, to assess if
IV methods provide an upper bound if lifetime incomes would be truly observed. The IV
benchmark estimate (ˆ βIV =0 .309, ˆ σˆ βIV =0 .037) is larger than our OLS benchmark estimate
(ˆ β =0 .273, ˆ σˆ β =0 .017), indicating that assumptions IV2 and IV3 can indeed be expected
to hold. However, the diﬀerence ˆ βIV − ˆ β is statistically insigniﬁcant.
To probe the validity of assumption IV1, we again focus on left-side measurement error
(using son’s annual income at age t) in order to abstract from attenuation bias and to directly
compare life-cycle bias in OLS and IV estimates. Figure 9 plots these estimates together with
the OLS benchmark ˆ β and reveals two important results.
First, life-cycle eﬀects from left-side measurement error are substantially larger in IV than
in OLS estimates.37 Adjustment by λt would thus improve IV estimates only modestly. Usage
of education as an instrument aggravates the life-cycle bias since income proﬁles diﬀer strongly
with education — the covariances in eq. (6) are thus relatively large (c.f. section 3.4). Second,
IV estimates are well below the benchmark also at t* at age 33 (ˆ βIV
t∗ =0 .183, ˆ σˆ βIV
t∗ =0 .056
whereas ˆ β =0 .270, ˆ σˆ β =0 .017). We therefore conclude that absent life-cycle eﬀects,I V
estimates bound the true parameter from above. But since applications are typically based
on current income, IV estimates do not bound β in practice. Given the large sensitivity of
IV estimates to the age at which sons’ incomes are measured (ranging between 0.08 and 0.53
over ages 30-45), we argue that comparisons of IV estimates across populations are not robust
if based on short spans of income data.
4.2 Life-Cycle Patterns in Income Across Subgroups
An alternative method to address life-cycle bias is to model life-cycle income processes across
subgroups. For example, Vogel (2006) models income growth across diﬀerent skill groups
instead of assuming a uniform growth rate, and argues that the resulting measures of lifetime
income eradicates life-cycle bias in intergenerational elasticity estimates.
Education is an important determinant of individual income growth, so the procedure
can reduce measurement error in lifetime income that arises from idiosyncratic deviations
from average income growth. However, after accounting for diﬀerential income growth across
educational groups, other determinants of income will lead to deviations from the mean
income growth rate within the given group. Since such determinants might often be shared
by members of the same family, measurement errors in income growth rates are still likely
to be correlated within families. For example, if a father holds an occupation that typically
leads to steeper than average income growth, then his son’s income growth might also be
steeper because he is relatively more likely to enter the same occupation.38
This example indicates that estimates could be improved by considering additional in-
dividual characteristics for the estimation of growth rates in more speciﬁc subgroups. But
the crucial insight is that we will not be able to suﬃciently project life-cycle trajectories of
36We impute years of education from data on level of educational attainment as recorded in the 1970 census,
i.e. when the fathers were around 40 years old. Using level dummies yields similar results.
37In contrast, life-cycle eﬀects from right-side measurement error are not particularly strong in IV estimates
(ﬁgure available from the authors upon request). According to eq. (6) this is partly attributable to the down-
scaling eﬀect of η1 (ˆ η1 =0 .263 for our sample).
38Within-family correlation in the choice of profession can be observed, for example, in the likelihood of
becoming president of the United States. More comprehensive evidence based on a somewhat larger sample
is given in Corak and Piraino (2010).5 INCOME DYNAMICS IN OTHER FIELDS 15
income, since individual growth rates are determined by both observable and unobservable
characteristics that can correlate within families. Unexplained dispersion in income growth is
large: for example, Jenkins (2009) ﬁnds substantial deviations of individual income trajecto-
ries from average trajectories of groups deﬁned by education, sex, and birth cohort in British
data. The remaining life-cycle bias caused by within-family correlation of the unexplained
part of individual income growth rates should therefore not be expected to be negligible.
Our data allow us to provide evidence in support of this argument. We derive average
growth in log income for various groups of sons by regressing current log income on a poly-
nomial in age. Figure 10 depicts such income trajectories for four groups of sons deﬁned
by education (non-college/college) and their father’s lifetime income (below/above median).
We ﬁnd that while income trajectories are simply shifted for the two groups without col-
lege education, the diﬀerence in life-cycle patterns is substantial for the other two groups:
college-educated sons with richer fathers have much stronger income growth than college-
educated sons with poorer fathers. We thus ﬁnd evidence for deterministic heterogeneity in
income proﬁles even after controlling for a range of observable characteristics (sex, cohort,
age, country of birth and education).
This result is of interest beyond the intergenerational mobility literature, in particular for
the ongoing debate of whether idiosyncratic diﬀerences in income proﬁles of otherwise obser-
vationally equivalent individuals are mainly due to deterministic heterogeneity or persistent
stochastic shocks (see e.g. Guvenen, 2007 for a recent contribution). These two sources are
generally hard to distinguish from one another. We argue that the intergenerational dimen-
sion provides a novel perspective on this debate: systematic life-cycle patterns in income that
are transmitted within families cannot stem from unexpected stochastic shocks, but have to
be caused by deterministic factors. We thus conclude that unobserved deterministic hetero-
geneity in income proﬁles should be expected to be large, at least among highly educated
individuals.39 We expand on this issue in the next section.
5 Income Dynamics in Other Fields
Life-cycle bias in intergenerational mobility estimation arises from the inability to fully ad-
dress heterogeneity in income proﬁles. It follows that we need to understand individual
income dynamics over the life cycle before income dynamics over generations can be under-
stood. The intergenerational mobility literature thus faces similar diﬃculties as many other
literatures that depend on measures of long-run income values and income dynamics. In this
section we discuss our results in this more general context. In particular we comment on the
applicability of the GEiV model in the returns to schooling literature and on the literature
on income dynamics and stochastic shocks.
5.1 Income Dynamics and Stochastic Shocks
Permanent income40 and income risk are thought to be essential determinants of individual
behaviour.41 Measures of these are commonly derived by statistical decomposition of observed
39This ﬁnding is consistent with Guvenen (2009), who ﬁnds that heterogeneous income proﬁles explain a
larger fraction of income inequality among college-educated individuals.
40Ar e m i n d e ro ft e r m i n o l o g yi su s e f u lt od i s t i n g u i s he x - a n t ea n de x - p o s tc o n c e p t so fl o n g - r u ni n c o m es t a t u s .
Friedman gave an extensive exposition on that the term “permanent income” was to denote a theoretical
concept, an individual’s ex-ante expectation on some unspeciﬁed long-run income measure that individual
behaviour (consumption) is based on, not an ex-post realisation of a speciﬁc measure like lifetime income
(Friedman 1957, p.23). In the intergenerational mobility literature this distinction is not always clearly made,
see footnote 6.
41Al a r g el i t e r a t u r ee x p l o r e st h el i n kb e t w e e ni n n o v a t i o n si ni n c o m ea n dc o n s u m p t i o n . I n c o m er i s kh a s
increasingly also been related to other outcomes, including wealth inequality, saving, asset prices, crime,5 INCOME DYNAMICS IN OTHER FIELDS 16
income proﬁles into a part explained by observable individual-speciﬁc covariates and an auto-
correlated error term.42 The error term is often split into a random walk ("permanent
component" plus "permanent shock") and an AR(q) process (“transitory component”).43
Such decompositions equate unexplained dispersion in income with stochastic uncertainty:
individuals with stronger persistent income growth relative to others with similar observable
characteristics are thought to have experienced stronger positive permanent income shocks.
But what the econometrician, who has relatively little information on individual charac-
teristics, deems as unexpected shock might not be a shock to the individual. An alternative
strand of the literature suggests that individual income proﬁles instead diﬀer deterministically
as of unobserved heterogeneity, e.g. due to individual ability.44 Such latent heterogeneity
cannot be equated with uncertainty — for example, Cunha et al. (2005) argue that a sub-
stantial part of the variability in ex-post returns to schooling is predictable by individuals.
Income shock measures could thus be subject to measurement error that stems from confusion
of deterministic heterogeneity and stochastic uncertainty. The discussion of measurement is-
sues and income proﬁle heterogeneity in the intergenerational mobility literature becomes
interesting in this context.
First, an intergenerational perspective allows us to distinguish deterministic income het-
erogeneity from stochastic persistent shocks, since only the former will be (partially) trans-
mitted within families.45 In section 4.2, we showed that family background can explain a
substantial share of unexplained dispersion in income proﬁles even after controlling for a wide
range of observable characteristics. This result favors the view that unobserved heterogeneity
in income proﬁles can be quantitatively important.
Second, measurement error in income shocks should be expected to be non-classical,
since unobserved determinants of income growth (e.g. cognitive or non-cognitive abilities)
will correlate with shock measures. The impact of such measurement error is not restricted to
attenuation bias (as is often assumed in the literature) and can enter observed relationships
between outcomes and measures of income shocks in more complicated ways.46
Third, note that these problems arise even when the information set of the individual
and the econometrician coincide. Cunha et al. (2005) refer to the variability in the returns
to schooling that is unpredictable to the individual as reﬂecting ’luck’. We argue that it can
also reﬂect deterministic returns to characteristics that the individual is not aware of. For
example, abilities might be known or unknown to the individual but can in either case aﬀect
life-cycle income growth.
health, and child outcomes.
42An alternative strategy, presented in Blundell and Preston (1998), is to model the link between income
and consumption in order to infer permanent and transitory shocks from consumption data.
43Variations and extensions of such decomposition procedure include MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card
(1989), Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (1995), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
44This strand of the literature, originating in Lillard and Weiss (1979), allows for heterogeneity in trends.
Baker (1997) provides evidence that proﬁle heterogeneity models provide a more consistent representation
of earnings dynamics. Guvenen (2007; 2009) argue that accounting for heterogeneous income proﬁles yields
more accurate predictions about life-cycle consumption behavior. Browning et al. (2010) present a model
with heterogeneity in many additional parameters.
45Of course, we might expect that persistent stochastic shocks in parents’ income aﬀect their oﬀspring.
But such transmission within families would be deterministic, and would thus not represent (unexpected)
stochastic shocks for the oﬀspring. Likewise, individuals might tend to experience similar income shocks
within families (for example if family members tend to work in the same industry or region), but if their
income proﬁles show similarities over many years (for example because both parents and oﬀspring work in a
shrinking industry) then these income changes are unlikely to be unexpected to the oﬀspring.
46The consequences depend on the examined structural relationship. For example, it is not obvious why
ability should have an autonomous impact on consumption besides its relationship through income growth.
But correlation of permanent income shock measures with ability seems problematic for many other outcomes
that have recently been related to income shocks.6 CONCLUSIONS 17
Finally, the intergenerational mobility literature exempliﬁes well how stark the conse-
quences of non-classical measurement error can be and how diﬃcult it is to address such
measurement error. Revisions of estimation strategies in this literature were largely data
driven. It is a reason for caution that such data-driven validation is more diﬃcult in the
literature that relates stochastic income shocks to various outcomes — availability of longer
income histories is informative about ex-post lifetime measures, but not necessarily about
individuals’ expectations on long-run income status.
Of course, inference does often not depend on variation in individual income shocks, but
on variation on an aggregated scale (such as cohorts or regions). While the exact underlying
assumptions diﬀer across applications, our view is that it can be summarized as an instru-
mental variable problem: researchers search for dimensions (cohorts, regions, etc.) that cause
variation in the size of shocks, but relate to outcomes only via these shocks. Such aggrega-
tion will not necessarily eliminate measurement errors. For example, variation in income
processes over regions might stem from pure “market luck” that is orthogonal to conditions
within the region, but also from diﬀerences in the distributions of, or returns to, unobserved
determinants of income. The latter would cause measures of income shocks to correlate with
income determinants also on an aggregate scale.
5.2 Returns to Schooling
Empirical studies on the returns to schooling are potentially subject to life-cycle bias, as
diﬀerences in current earnings can misrepresent lifetime returns. The issue is less pressing
than for intergenerational mobility studies (the latter require data for two generations and
researchers are thus more likely to observe non-representative age spans), but it becomes
important under certain conditions. The actual relationship between current earnings and
schooling over the life cycle might not follow the speciﬁed functional relationship.47 Even with
a ﬂexible functional form one might fail to recover the true relationship if the age distribution
of sampled individuals does not represent the age span of interest.
This becomes particularly relevant in cohort-based estimation. Heckman et al. (2006)
argue that, given non-stationary labor markets, cohort analysis is preferred to an approach
in which various cohorts are sampled (the so-called synthetic cohort approach) to estimate
ex-post returns. Repeated cross-section or panel data are then required, in which researchers
rarely observe complete lifetime earnings. The question is if life-cycle bias can be eliminated
in estimates based on shorter earnings spans.
The GEiV model illustrates the diﬃculty of such reliance on short-term measures, but
implies that earnings diﬀerences at a certain age approximates diﬀerences in lifetime earnings
and thus lifetime returns to schooling well. However, our analysis shows that the model
provides only a partial correction for life-cycle eﬀects. Knowledge of the central parameter λt
is insuﬃcient, since the shapes of earnings proﬁles of diﬀerent educational subgroups deviate
from the population average grasped by λt. The projection error from eq. (3) thus correlates
with education, which we conﬁrm empirically in section 3.4. Bhuller et al. (2011) present
a general analysis of life-cycle bias in returns to schooling estimates, and also analyze the
applicability of the GEiV model in this context.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that recent methodological advances in the estimation
of intergenerational income elasticities do not eliminate life-cycle bias. Current empirical
47For example, Heckman et al. (2006) argue that log earnings in schooling and experience are not multi-
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practice based on the generalized errors-in-variables model improves estimates, but we ﬁnd
that the remaining life-cycle bias is nevertheless substantial. The bias is strongly negative
when using annual income below age 30, and remains negative in the mid-thirties. Since this
is the age at which studies that rely on the generalized model have aimed to measure income,
we expect resulting estimates to (still) understate the intergenerational elasticity.
One might argue that remaining life-cycle biases do not pose major problems, since in-
terest often lies in the relative intergenerational mobility across populations (e.g. in cross-
country studies). Estimates might be suﬃciently precise if we believe that the magnitude
of the remaining life-cycle bias is similar across countries. However, such belief would cor-
respond to the assumption that within-family correlation in the shape of income proﬁles is
of the same magnitude across countries. It is therefore a direct restriction on a potential
characteristic of intergenerational mobility. Since countries diﬀer with respect to the degree
of intergenerational mobility, we also suspect that they diﬀer in this speciﬁc aspect of it.
Comparisons of intergenerational elasticity estimates based on short-run income data
across countries, groups or cohorts are thus of limited reliability, unless diﬀerences in estimates
are large. Our ﬁnding that the life-cycle bias varies even across Swedish cohorts born in the
same decade supports this conclusion. Moreover, comparisons are even less robust if based
on IV estimates, which we ﬁnd to suﬀer from larger life-cycle eﬀects than OLS estimates.
Our analysis provides some guidance for applied research. We ﬁnd evidence that annual
incomes at later ages (e.g. age 40-50) provide a more reliable base for application of the
GEiV model. The remaining life-cycle bias can be further reduced by averaging over multiple
income observations for both fathers and sons, and the treatment of zero and missing income
observations has important consequences. To derive a general measure of mobility one would
like to include such observations, but doing so comes with the cost of increased vulnerability
to life-cycle bias.
Further reﬁnements of empirical practice with restricted use of income observations around
a speciﬁc age can thus improve upon previous estimates, but will not eliminate life-cycle
bias. Development of a more structured approach that aims to capitalize on all available
income data seems thus desirable. Future research could in particular beneﬁt from a more
comprehensive exploitation of partially observed income growth patterns. Intergenerational
mobility estimates are often based on multiple income observations per individual, but re-
searchers typically disregard the idiosyncratic income growth across these observations. Such
partially observed growth patterns are determined by all observable and unobservable char-
acteristics of the individual. Hence they contain more information on the unobserved part of
income proﬁles and thus on lifetime income than what current income levels and observable
characteristics can provide.
Our results add to a general conclusion that can be drawn from the intergenerational
mobility literature: addressing heterogeneity in income proﬁles is an important, diﬃcult and
recurrently underestimated task. The central problem is that idiosyncratic deviations from
average income proﬁles correlate with a wide range of individual and family characteristics.
We hope that our discussion underlines the potential severity of this issue for other literatures
that rely on measurement of long-run income or income dynamics.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 19
7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations by Son’s Birth Year
All 1955 1956 1957
Father’s age at birth of son 24.68 (2.53) 24.66 (2.51) 24.77 (2.50) 24.62 (2.58)
log lifetime income (sons) 11.97 (0.43) 11.98 (0.42) 11.98 (0.42) 11.95 (0.44)
log lifetime income (fathers) 11.72 (0.42) 11.73 (0.44) 11.72 (0.43) 11.72 (0.40)
# of pos. income obs. (sons) 28.52 (1.86) 28.57 (1.71) 28.56 (1.74) 28.43 (2.11)
# of pos. income obs. (fathers) 30.32 (3.76) 29.99 (4.13) 30.36 (3.62) 30.59 (3.48)
Father-son pairs (N)3 5 0 4 1 1 6 7 1 1 7 3 1 1 6 4
Notes: Lifetime income is annuitized by dividing total lifetime income by number of non-missing income
observations.
Table 2: OLS Estimates of Elasticities and Life-Cycle Bias
t=Age ˆ λs,t ˆ β ˆ βt ˆ βt/ˆ λs,t ˆ b(t) ˆ b(t) in % N
31 0.897 0.266 0.191 0.213 -0.053 19.8 3478
(0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.029) (0.021)
32 0.909 0.267 0.246 0.271 0.003 1.3 3476
(0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.028) (0.021)
33 0.982 0.267 0.203 0.207 -0.061 22.7 3479
(0.020) (0.016) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024)
34 1.039 0.256 0.212 0.204 -0.051 20.1 3469
(0.019) (0.016) (0.025) (0.031) (0.023)
35 1.114 0.261 0.234 0.210 -0.052 19.7 3460
(0.021) (0.016) (0.027) (0.029) (0.022)
Notes: Cohort group 1955-1957, left-side measurement error only. Standard errors in
parentheses, which for ˆ βt/ˆ λs,t and ˆ b(t) are based on Taylor approximations that take the
covariance structure of ˆ λs,t, ˆ β,a n d ˆ βt into account. Column (7) displays ˆ b(t) in percent of
our benchmark estimate ˆ β.
Table 3: Decomposition of Life-Cycle Bias
t=Age ˆ b(t) Corr(y∗
f, ˆ us,t) ˆ σus,t ˆ σy∗
f ˆ σus,t/ˆ λs,tˆ σy∗
f
31 -0.053 -0.044 0.455 0.424 1.198
32 0.003 0.003 0.431 0.423 1.123
33 -0.061 -0.052 0.485 0.422 1.169
34 -0.051 -0.050 0.452 0.422 1.031
35 -0.052 -0.049 0.494 0.422 1.050
Notes: Cohort group 1955-1957, left-side measurement error only.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 20
Table 4: OLS Estimates with Multi-Year Averages of Son’s Income
t=Age ˆ λs,tt
ˆ β ˆ βt ˆ βt/λs,t ˆ b(t)ˆ σus,it Corr(ˆ us,it,y∗
f,i) N
9A: Three-Year Average
31 0.863 0.268 0.218 0.253 -0.015 0.339 -0.016 3496
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.017)
32 0.948 0.267 0.214 0.226 -0.041 0.365 -0.045 3499
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.017)
33 1.011 0.267 0.229 0.227 -0.041 0.372 -0.047 3495
(0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.030) (0.022)
34 1.078 0.268 0.229 0.212 -0.056 0.396 -0.064 3491
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.028) (0.020)
35 1.142 0.262 0.232 0.203 -0.059 0.411 -0.069 3486
(0.017) (0.016) (0.025) (0.028) (0.020)
9B: Five-Year Average
31 0.847 0.268 0.213 0.251 -0.017 0.290 -0.021 3500
(0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.014)
32 0.925 0.268 0.229 0.248 -0.020 0.310 -0.025 3501
(0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.014)
33 1.010 0.267 0.226 0.224 -0.043 0.336 -0.055 3500
(0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.026) (0.016)
34 1.057 0.267 0.235 0.222 -0.044 0.332 -0.060 3497
(0.013) (0.016) (0.022) (0.028) (0.018)
35 1.141 0.268 0.247 0.216 -0.052 0.384 -0.065 3495
(0.015) (0.016) (0.024) (0.028) (0.019)
9C: Seven-Year Average
31 0.866 0.270 0.221 0.255 -0.015 0.279 -0.020 3503
(0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.013)
32 0.908 0.268 0.227 0.250 -0.018 0.261 -0.026 3501
(0.010) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.013)
33 0.975 0.268 0.238 0.245 -0.023 0.279 -0.034 3502
(0.011) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.013)
34 1.069 0.268 0.245 0.229 -0.038 0.318 -0.055 3502
(0.013) (0.016) (0.022) (0.025) (0.015)
35 1.122 0.267 0.251 0.224 -0.044 0.341 -0.061 3500
(0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.027) (0.017)
Notes: Cohort 1955-57, left-side measurement error only. Current income of sons are measured as three-,
ﬁve-, and seven-year averages centered around age t. ˆ βt is the coeﬃcient from regressing the log of the
average on father’s log lifetime income. λs,t is from the regression of the log of the average on the son’s log
lifetime income. Standard errors are in parentheses.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 21
Table 5: Robustness Tests with Sample Variations
t=Age ˆ λs,t ˆ β ˆ βt ˆ βt/ˆ λs,t ˆ b(t)ˆ σus,it Corr(ˆ us,it,y∗
f,i) N
8A: Balanced Sample
31 0.826 0.257 0.184 0.223 -0.033 0.408 -0.029 3415
(0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021)
32 0.839 0.257 0.227 0.271 0.014 0.398 0.012 3415
(0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.028) (0.021)
33 0.909 0.257 0.185 0.203 -0.053 0.445 -0.046 3415
(0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.032) (0.025)
34 0.964 0.257 0.219 0.227 -0.029 0.402 -0.030 3415
(0.018) (0.015) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021)
35 1.043 0.257 0.239 0.229 -0.027 0.457 -0.026 3415
(0.020) (0.015) (0.024) (0.027) (0.020)
8B: Bottom-Coded Incomes
31 0.913 0.271 0.205 0.225 -0.046 0.442 -0.040 3498
(0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.028) (0.020)
32 0.947 0.271 0.245 0.259 -0.012 0.434 -0.011 3500
(0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.029) (0.020)
33 0.999 0.270 0.201 0.201 -0.069 0.434 -0.067 3501
(0.018) (0.016) (0.024) (0.030) (0.022)
34 1.094 0.270 0.247 0.226 -0.044 0.437 -0.046 3501
(0.018) (0.016) (0.025) (0.029) (0.020)
35 1.153 0.270 0.250 0.217 -0.053 0.450 -0.057 3498
(0.018) (0.016) (0.026) (0.028) (0.019)
8C: Top-Coded Incomes
31 0.951 0.251 0.191 0.201 -0.050 0.448 -0.045 3478
(0.019) (0.016) (0.024) (0.027) (0.020)
32 0.959 0.252 0.246 0.257 0.005 0.426 0.004 3476
(0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.027) (0.019)
33 1.038 0.252 0.203 0.196 -0.056 0.477 -0.051 3479
(0.020) (0.016) (0.025) (0.029) (0.023)
34 1.104 0.240 0.213 0.193 -0.047 0.443 -0.050 3469
(0.019) (0.015) (0.025) (0.029) (0.022)
35 1.185 0.246 0.234 0.198 -0.048 0.484 -0.050 3460
(0.021) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020)
Notes: Cohort 1955-57, left-side measurement error only. Panel A is balanced across ages, hence excluding
all observations of individuals who have zero or missing incomes at any age 31-35. In panel B, annual
incomes of sons below 10 000 SEK are bottom-coded up to 10 000 SEK (including zeros, but excluding
missings). In panel C, annual incomes of sons above 2 million SEK are top-coded down to 2 million SEK.
Standard errors are in parentheses.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 22
Table 6: Summary of Cohort Diﬀerences, Averages over Ages 31-35
Cohort Group ˆ λs,t ˆ β ˆ βt ˆ βt/ˆ λs,t ˆ b(t) ˆ b(t) in % N
1958-60 1.071 0.274 0.235 0.220 -0.054 19.9 3427
(0.022) (0.016) (0.028) (0.032) (0.026)
1955-57 1.066 0.246 0.216 0.204 -0.042 17.2 3444
(0.020) (0.015) (0.024) (0.028) (0.020)
1952-54 1.059 0.206 0.190 0.179 -0.027 12.8 3160
(0.021) (0.015) (0.024) (0.027) (0.019)
Notes: Left-side measurement error only. Table displays averages of estimates and standard errors
(in parentheses) across ages 31-35. ˆ b(t) is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p-value<0.05) at three
ages (out of ﬁve) for 1958-60, at four ages for 1955-57, and at two ages for 1952-54. For all cohort
groups, lifetime income is restricted to be measured over identical ages: 22-47 for sons, and 36-65
for fathers. Column (7) displays ˆ b(t) in percent of our benchmark estimate ˆ β (as average over the
age interval).
Table 7: Correlations Between Residuals and Characteristics
Age Interval of Sons
26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50
Father’s log lifetime income -0.057* -0.050* -0.063* -0.020 -0.007
Father’s age at birth of son -0.054* 0.014 0.045* 0.017 -0.006
Father’s education -0.158* -0.061* -0.045* 0.035 0.028
Son’s education -0.278* -0.112* -0.002 0.085* 0.088*
Son’s cognitive ability -0.108* -0.073* -0.050* 0.022 -0.004
Son’s country of birth -0.040* -0.026 -0.002 -0.032 0.028
Cohort 1955-1957. Table depicts correlations between characteristics listed in the ﬁrst
column and the residuals (as average in each ﬁve-year year age interval) from eq. (3). The
education variables are years of education measured at about age 35, "Son’s country of
birth" is an indicator for being born outside Sweden, and "Son’s cognitive ability" is a
standardized cognitive ability measure from the military enlistment cognitive test at age 18.
Superscript star indicates whether correlation has p-value<0.05.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 23





















Notes: Illustrative Example. For each worker, the upward-sloping line depicts log annual income by age, the
horizontal line depicts log annuitized lifetime income.








25 30 35 40 45 50
t = age of sons
Estimates
95% CI7 TABLES AND FIGURES 24













25 30 35 40 45 50
t = age of sons
Benchmark Estimate
Estimates of  t
Estimates of  t /  s,t
Notes: Cohort 1955-57, left-side measurement error only.
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30 35 40 45
t = age of sons
Life−Cycle Bias Life−Cycle Bias (Adjusted by  s,t)
Notes: Left-side measurement error only. The age span of observed incomes of sons (fathers) varies along
the horizontal (vertical) dimension.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 25
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30 35 40 45
t = age of sons
Life−Cycle Bias Life−Cycle Bias (Adjusted by  s,t)
Notes: Left-side measurement error only. The age span of observed incomes of sons (fathers) varies along
the horizontal (vertical) dimension.
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30 35 40 45
t = age of sons
Life−Cycle Bias Life−Cycle Bias (Adjusted by  s,t)
Notes: Left-side measurement error only. The age span of observed incomes of sons (fathers) varies along
the horizontal (vertical) dimension.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 26
















35 40 45 50 55 60 65
t = age of fathers
Benchmark Estimate
Estimates of  t
Estimates of  t /  f,t
Notes: Cohort 1955-57, right-side measurement error only.
















−5 0 5 10 15
s = years from t*
Benchmark Estimate
Estimates of  t
Estimates of  t /  f,t s,t
Notes: Cohort 1955-57, measurement error on both sides. To keep the analysis in two dimensions, we only
display results for annual incomes at the same distance from t* for sons and fathers. At s=0 both are
measured at their respective t*, at s=5 both are measured ﬁve years after t*, etc.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 27





















25 30 35 40 45 50
t = age of sons
Benchmark Estimates
OLS Estimates of  t
IV Estimates of  t
Notes: Cohort 1955-57, left-side measurement error only.








































25 30 35 40 45 50
t = age of sons
College No College
Notes: The trajectories depict average growth in log income over the life cycle for sons born in 1955-57,
separately for sons with fathers above and below median lifetime income.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 28



















30 35 40 45
t = age of sons
Life−Cycle Bias for Cohort 1952−54
Life−Cycle Bias for Cohort 1955−57
Life−Cycle Bias for Cohort 1958−60
Notes: Left-side measurement error only. For all cohorts, lifetime income is restricted to be measured over
identical ages: 22-47 for sons, and 36-65 for fathers.
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t = age of sons
Life−Cycle Bias (Adjusted by  s,t) for Cohort 1952−54
Life−Cycle Bias (Adjusted by  s,t) for Cohort 1955−57
Life−Cycle Bias (Adjusted by  s,t) for Cohort 1958−60
Notes: Left-side measurement error only. For all cohorts, lifetime income is restricted to be measured over
identical ages: 22-47 for sons, and 36-65 for fathers.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 29











































Notes: Cohort 1955-57, measurement error on both sides. Estimates are based on 3-year averages of annual
income and are only corrected for attenuation bias (no application of the GEiV model).8A P P E N D I X 30
8 Appendix
A.1 Annual and Lifetime Values Over the Life Cycle
Proposition. (i) For all age t,t h ed i ﬀ e r e n c eb e t w e e nl o ga n n u a li n c o m eyit and the log of
the annuitized value of the present discounted value of lifetime income varies with respect to
the individual’s income growth rate γi.( i i )F o ra n yg i v e na g et,t h ed i ﬀ e r e n c ew i l lb ee q u a l
for at most two diﬀerent realizations of γi.
Proof. As in Haider and Solon (2006), suppose that log annual income of worker i at age t is
given by
yit = ηi + γit (7)
For simplicity assume inﬁnite lifetimes and a constant real interest rate r>γ i. The annuitized
value of the present discounted value of lifetime income, denoted Bi, is then
∞ ￿
s=0
exp(ηi + γis)(1 + r)−s =
∞ ￿
s=0











exp(ηi + γis)(1 + r)−s
￿
∼ = logr + ηi − log(r − γi)
The diﬀerence Dit between log annual income yit and the log of the annuitized value of the
present discounted value of lifetime income logBi is thus
Dit = γit − logr + log(r − γi)






The second derivative with respect to γi is negative,
∂2Dit
∂2γi
= −(r − γi)
−2 < 0
Dit is therefore a strictly concave function of γi conditional on t given, and a speciﬁc
value of Dit can stem from at most two diﬀerent values of γi.
A.2 Life-Cycle Bias: Left-Side Measurement Error
Assume that we wish to estimate the regression model (1), but that log lifetime income of
sons y∗
s,i is approximated by ys,it, log annual income at age t. Fathers’ log lifetime income
y∗
f,i is observed. We express the linear projection of ys,it on y∗
s,i as in eq. (3). As shown in
section 2, the probability limit of the OLS estimator of a linear regression of ys,it on y∗
f,i is
then




f)8A P P E N D I X 31





exp(ηi + γis)s(1 + r)−s)
= ηi + log(1 + r) − log(1 + r − exp(γi)) (8)
and rewrite
us,it = ys,it − λs,ty∗
s,i
= ηi + γs




i denote income growth rates of fathers and sons. For simplicity assume that




γ. The probability limit of ˆ βt at age t∗ for which
λs,t =1is then48
plim ˆ βt = β −
Cov
￿
log(1 + r − exp(γ
f
i )),γs









If lifetime income correlates within families we should also expect correlation of income growth
rates within families. The second term in the previous expression is thus non-zero for a general
class of joint distribution functions for γ
f
i ,γs
i and represents the life-cycle bias. For example,


















































yields approximation of the covariance matrix

































This covariance can be evaluated for speciﬁc choices of µγ, σ2
γ, ρ and r. The underlying
income formation model is quite artiﬁcial (inﬁnite lifetimes), but simulation results reported
in Stuhler (2010) verify that the size of the life-cycle bias under log-linear income formation












γ/r2 it follows that t
∗ can be approximated by 1/r.8A P P E N D I X 32
A.3 Life-Cycle Bias: Right-Side Measurement Error
Assume that we wish to estimate the regression model (1), but that log lifetime income of
fathers y∗
f,i is approximated by yf,it, log annual income at age t. Sons’ log lifetime income
y∗




The probability limit of the OLS estimator of a linear regression of y∗
s,i on yf,it is then









where the ﬁrst step follows since the errors ￿i and uf,it are by construction uncorrelated
with y∗







is the “reliability ratio” that
can be interpreted as the slope coeﬃcient in the “reverse regression” of y∗
f,i on yf,it. The
reliability ratio reduces to the familiar attenuation bias if yf,it is measured at age t∗ such that
λf,t =1 . The GEiV model is based on the assumption that uf,it is uncorrelated to y∗
s,i. It can
account for the reliability ratio, but not for the remaining life-cycle bias in the second term
of the last line that stems from correlation in the shape of income proﬁles within families.
A.4 Life-Cycle Bias: Left- and Right-Side Measurement Error
Assume that we wish to estimate the regression model (1), but that log lifetime incomes of
fathers y∗
f,i and sons y∗
f,i are not observed and thus approximated by yf,it and ys,it,l o ga n n u a l








The probability limit of the OLS estimator of a linear regression of ys,it on yf,it is then











If log annual income of fathers and sons are measured at ages such that λs,t = λf,t =1
then the probability limit of the estimator reduces to







an expression akin (except for the subscript t) to the general eq. (2).
49Note that for notational simplicity we here do not distinguish the age subscripts for fathers and sons.REFERENCES 33
References
Abowd, J., and D. Card (1989): “On the Covariance Structure of Earnings and Hours
Changes,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society,5 7 ( 2 ) ,4 1 1 – 4 4 5 .
Atkinson, A. (1980): “On Intergenerational Income Mobility in Britain,” Journal of Post
Keynesian Economics,3 ( 2 ) ,1 9 4 – 2 1 8 .
Baker, M. (1997): “Growth-Rate Heterogeneity and the Covariance Structure of Life-Cycle
Earnings,” Journal of Labor Economics,1 5 ( 2 ) ,3 3 8 – 7 5 .
Becker, G., and N. Tomes (1979): “An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income
and Intergenerational Mobility,” The Journal of Political Economy,8 7 ( 6 ) ,1 1 5 3 – 1 1 8 9 .
(1986): “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families,” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics,4 ( 3 ) ,1 – 3 9 .
Bhuller, M., M. Mogstad, and K. G. Salvanes (2011): “Life-Cycle Bias and the Returns
to Schooling in Current and Lifetime Earnings,” Unpublished working paper.
Björklund, A. (1993): “A Comparison between Actual Distributions of Annual and Life-
time Income: Sweden 1951-89,” Review of Income and Wealth,3 9 ( 4 ) ,3 7 7 – 3 8 6 .
Björklund, A., and M. Jäntti (1997): “Intergenerational Income Mobility in Sweden
Compared to the United States,” American Economic Review,8 7 ( 5 ) ,1 0 0 9 – 1 8 .
Björklund, A., and M. Jäntti (2009): “Intergenerational Income Mobility and the
Role of Family Background,” in Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality, ed. by B. N.
Salverda Wiemer, and T. M. Smeeding. Oxford University Press.
Björklund, A., M. Jäntti, and M. J. Lindquist (2009): “Family Background and
Income During the Rise of the Welfare State: Brother Correlations in Income for Swedish
Men born 1932-1968,” Journal of Public Economics,9 3 ( 5 - 6 ) ,6 7 1–6 8 0 .
Björklund, A., M. Lindahl, and E. Plug (2006): “The Origins of Intergenerational
Associations: Lessons from Swedish Adoption Data,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
121(3), 999–1029.
Black, S. E., and P. Devereux (2011): “Recent Developments in Intergenerational Mo-
bility,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and D. Card, vol. 4A/4B.
Elsevier.
Blundell, R., and I. Preston (1998): “Consumption Inequality and Income Uncertainty,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics,1 1 3 ( 2 ) ,6 0 3 – 6 4 0 .
Böhlmark, A., and M. Lindquist (2006): “Life-Cycle Variations in the Association be-
tween Current and Lifetime Income: Replication and Extension for Sweden,” Journal of
Labor Economics,2 4 ( 4 ) ,8 7 9 – 8 9 6 .
Browning, M., M. Ejrnæs, and J. Alvarez (2010): “Modelling Income Processes with
Lots of Heterogeneity,” Review of Economic Studies,7 7 ( 4 ) ,1 3 5 3 – 1 3 8 1 .
Corak, M., and P. Piraino (2010): “The Intergenerational Transmission of Employers,”
Journal of Labor Economics,2 9 ( 1 ) ,3 7 – 6 8 .
Couch, K., and D. Lillard (1998): “Sample Selection Rules and the Intergenerational
Correlation of Earnings,” Labour Economics,5 ( 3 ) ,3 1 3 – 3 2 9 .REFERENCES 34
Cunha, F., J. Heckman, and S. Navarro (2005): “Separating Uncertainty from Hetero-
geneity in Life Cycle Earnings,” Oxford Economic Papers,5 7 ( 2 ) ,1 9 1 .
Dahl, M., and T. DeLeire (2008): “The Association Between Children’s Earnings And
Fathers’ Lifetime Earnings: Estimates Using Administrative Data,” Discussion Paper No.
1342-08, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Friedman, M. (1957): AT h e o r yo ft h eC o n s u m p t i o nF u n c t i o n . National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Gouskova, E., N. Chiteji, and F. Stafford (2010): “Estimating the Intergenerational
Persistence of Lifetime Earnings with Life Course Matching: Evidence from the PSID,”
Labour Economics,1 7 ( 3 ) ,5 9 2 – 5 9 7 .
Grawe, N. D. (2006): “Lifecycle Bias in Estimates of Intergenerational Earnings Persis-
tence,” Labour Economics,1 3 ( 5 ) ,5 5 1 – 5 7 0 .
Guvenen, F. (2007): “Learning Your Earning: Are Labor Income Shocks Really Very Per-
sistent?,” American Economic Review,9 7 ( 3 ) ,6 8 7 – 7 1 2 .
(2009): “An Empirical Investigation of Labor Income Processes,” Review of Economic
Dynamics,1 2 ( 1 ) ,5 8 – 7 9 .
Haider, S., and G. Solon (2006): “Life-Cycle Variation in the Association between Current
and Lifetime Earnings,” American Economic Review,9 6 ( 4 ) ,1 3 0 8 – 1 3 2 0 .
Heckman, J. J., L. J. Lochner, and P. E. Todd (2006): “Earnings Functions, Rates
of Return and Treatment Eﬀects: The Mincer Equation and Beyond,” in Handbook of the
Economics of Education, ed. by E. Hanushek, and F. Welch, vol. 1, chap. 7, pp. 307–458.
Elsevier.
Jenkins, S. (1987): “Snapshots versus Movies: ‘Lifecycle biases’ and the Estimation of
Intergenerational Earnings Inheritance,” European Economic Review,3 1 ( 5 ) ,1 1 4 9 – 1 1 5 8 .
(2009): “Spaghetti Unravelled: A Model-Based Description of Diﬀerences in Income-
Age Trajectories,” ISER Working Paper Series 2009-30, Institute for Social and Economic
Research, University of Essex.
Lillard, L. A., and Y. Weiss (1979): “Components of Variation in Panel Earnings Data:
American Scientists, 1960-70,” Econometrica,4 7 ( 2 ) ,4 3 7 – 5 4 .
MaCurdy, T. (1982): “The Use of Time Series Processes to Model the Error Structure of
Earnings in a Longitudinal Data Analysis,” Journal of Econometrics,1 8 ( 1 ) ,8 3 – 1 1 4 .
Mazumder, B. (2005): “Fortunate Sons: New Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in the
United States Using Social Security Earnings Data,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
87(2), 235–255.
Meghir, C., and L. Pistaferri (2004): “Income Variance Dynamics and Heterogeneity,”
Econometrica,7 2 ( 1 ) ,1 – 3 2 .
Mocetti, S. (2007): “Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in Italy,” The B.E. Journal of
Economic Analysis & Policy, 7(2), Article 5.
Moffitt, R., and P. Gottschalk (1995): “Trends in the Covariance Structure of Earnings
in the United States: 1969-1987,” Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers
1001-93, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.REFERENCES 35
Nicoletti, C., and J. Ermisch (2007): “Intergenerational Earnings Mobility: Changes
across Cohorts in Britain,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 7(2), Article
9.
Nilsen, Ø., K. Vaage, A. Aakvik, and K. Jacobsen (forthcoming): “Intergenerational
Earnings Mobility Revisited: Estimates Based on Lifetime Earnings,” Scandinavian Jour-
nal of Economics.
Piraino, P. (2007): “Comparable Estimates of Intergenerational Income Mobility in Italy,”
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 7(2), Article 1.
Raaum, O., B. Bratsberg, K. Røed, E. Österbacka, T. Eriksson, M. Jäntti,
and R. Naylor (2007): “Marital Sorting, Household Labor Supply, and Intergenerational
Earnings Mobility across Countries,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,
7(2), Article 7.
Solon, G. (1992): “Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States,” American
Economic Review,8 2 ( 3 ) ,3 9 3 – 4 0 8 .
Solon, G. (1999): “Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market,” in Handbook of Labor
Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and D. Card, vol. 3A, chap. 29, pp. 1761–1800. Elsevier.
Stuhler, J. (2010): “Empirical Strategies to Eliminate Life-Cycle Bias in the Intergener-
ational Elasticity of Earnings Literature,” IZA Discussion Papers 5245, Institute for the
Study of Labor (IZA).
Vogel, T. (2006): “Reassessing Intergenerational Mobility in Germany and the United
States: The Impact of Diﬀerences in Lifecycle Earnings Patterns,” SFB 649 Discussion
Papers 2006-055, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
Zimmerman, D. J. (1992): “Regression toward Mediocrity in Economic Stature,” American
Economic Review,8 2 ( 3 ) ,4 0 9 – 2 9 .